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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER: DAYLE E. SPENCER
MODERATOR: THOMAS L. SHAFFER
SPEECH: "LESSONS FROM THE FIELD OF
INTRA-NATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION"
DATE: FEBRUARY 21, 1992
Professor Shaffer: [Professor, Notre Dame Law School.]
So we're open for questions and comments on Dr. Spencer's
paper. If you have any questions or comments for Dr. Carter, per-
haps you can relay them.
Professor Goulet: [Dennis Goulet, Professor, Department of Govern-
ment, University of Notre Dame.]
You just spoke of the four paths that you employed to try to
break the log jam. All of these paths are procedures, they are
channels. At the beginning, when there seemed to be an absolute-
ly irreconcilable fixation on national sovereignty and
self-determination, what topics or substantive issues did you choose
to discuss in the paths, and how were these .topics chosen?
Dr. Spencer: The two rounds of negotiations that I described ad-
dressed procedural issues. That is to say: how would the parties
manage their substantive negotiations? They reached agreement
on working languages, they reached agreement on records, they
reached agreement on venue, they reached agreement on
co-chairmen, and so forth. There were fourteen separate areas of
written agreement between them by the end of the Nairobi talks.
Now, in those particular topics, there was not as much tension as
there was on. the ultimate issue of national sovereignty versus
self-determination.
But one of the things that we learned from another path,
which is working with these joints groups such as the group that
Roger was involved with that I mentioned, was that sometimes you
can fractionate those seemingly irreconcilable issues and begin to
build small agreements on parts that are not as threatening to
them. And on the basis of those small agreements, work toward
the larger agreements.
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Let me just give you one example of what I mean by that. If
you look at the question of national sovereignty, it is a label that
encompasses a lot of different component parts. It may be that
national sovereignty includes the right to fly a flag, the right to
raise taxes, the right to operate a standing army, the right to have
roads, or the right to have an educational system. There may be a
hundred different components of national sovereignty. If you
could fractionate that and begin to talk to the parties about may-
be one through twenty-five of those that are not so threatening
and not so inviolate. Once you get an agreement on some of
those, then the degree of trust building that occurs just in that
process can help you move the larger issues.
Professor Demars: [William Demars, Professor, Department of Gov-
ernment and International Relations, University of Notre Dame.]
I wonder if you could comment on the role of a particular set
of issues, famine relief in particular, and where did that fit? For
example, was that one of those issues where you could get agree-
ment and attempt to build? And did you get agreements on spe-
cific famine issues? And were you able to make that transfer and
build from that on to others?
Dr. Spencer: Ethiopia and Eritrea had been struck by this major
famine in 1984 and 1985. Many, many people had died in that.
That's the one we all saw on television with the children with
swollen stomachs, dark circles under their eyes, and with the flies.
Everybody has a visual image of what that famine was like. Well,
so did the government of Ethiopia. And the visual image that they
had was that the international community had blamed them for
the problem, had said, you didn't take measures to stop this when
you knew it was coming. You didn't feed your people when you
might have, and you didn't let the international relief agencies
feed your people when they were willing to do so because you
wouldn't cooperate with them. And so what we were able to
do-and again, this occurred only after literally months and
months of direct involvement with these parties-was to use the
influence that we had developed with the degree of legitimacy
that we had with them was to just say to in very candid ways, that
if this isn't dealt with, you're going to be blamed again. President
Carter would meet directly with Mengistu and suggest to him cer-
tain things that he could do as a head of state to facilitate this
process. It was heard differently by Mengistu coming from another
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head of state than it would have been heard by a less powerful
third party perhaps, and it was responded to.
We were able to get access for ,the relief agencies that they
had not previously had. The Eritreans had inadvertently bombed a
truck that was carrying relief supplies during the famine, so they
were mindful as well of their international prestige suffering from
that incident.
So in each case, we were able to work in parallel ways. It was
not that they worked together to develop a joint famine strategy.
Through the third party, each developed a strategy.
Professor Demars: The second part of my question was: were you
able to build from those parallel agreements into anything else?
Was there any linkage?
Dr. Spencer: It's. hard to draw a direct linkage between what was
happening on the ground with the famine relief and what was
happening at the negotiation table. But I do think that they began
to see the third parties as individuals who cared about their peo-
ple. It was not enough for us just to question the procedural nice-
ties or substantive agreements or whatever. It was a concern about
their civilian population. So I think to some degree there was
some transference factor. But it would be hard, if not impossible,
to say there was a direct linkage.
Dr. Johnston: [Douglas Johnston, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies.]
Dayle, I agree totally with your notion about the U.N. getting
involved in internal conflicts, and it would seem a bit of a prece-
dent has now been established.
But I also wonder if, given the plethora of these conflicts that
exist, whether or not we may end up in a situation where it's
oversaturated, more than the U.N. could bear. Might that fall into
a need for a regional kind of approach, where, for example, you
have the C.S.C.E. attempting to do something in this area in that
region? We also might want to look toward similar counterparts in
other regions of the world. I really think it's more than the U.N.
will be able to handle.
Dr. Spencer: I agree with you entirely, Doug. It is not the exclusive
prerogative of the United Nations, although they are the premiere
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agency charged with this sort of responsibility at the
intergovernmental level.
Actually, I would take that one step further. I think it's in-
cumbent on each of us as individuals to be involved in
peace-making. It is easy enough to let the governments do it or
let the international organizations do it.
If you look again at the global perspective, we are spend-
ing $2 million a: minute on defense. And yet when the United
Nations tries to collect the dues from the member nations just to
maintain their peace-making and peace-keeping ability, the United
States doesn't even pay its debt. We don't honor our treaty obliga-
tions to the United Nations. So it's incumbent on us to shift that
level of emphasis from everything for the military structure and
everything for the defense environment, at the rate of $2 million
a minute, to a significant portion on peace-making and
peace-keeping at the U.N., at the regional and international orga-
nization level, but also at the community level.
Participant: My question feels sort of crass to ask, but I think it has
some impact. And that is: how were the negotiations in Ethiopia
paid for? I imagine it was expensive to transport teams of dele-
gates and negotiators to the United States and to Nairobi. Are
these kinds of resources available for other conflicts and countless
others? I would guess that before the U.N. or other organizations,
even regional organizations, are going to start to commit monies
to that, they want to see some successes, and someone probably is
going to pay for those efforts before larger monies, the $2 million
you talked about, can be found.
Dr. Spencer: I think that's not at all a crass question, but a funda-
mental one. We didn't have the budget to fund these peace talks
when we were asked to convene them, and we literally had to go
out and raise the money. We had a great deal of support from
the Nordic countries, from Sweden and from Norway in particular.
The parties themselves bore a portion of the expense. They paid
for their own travel, for example, to Atlanta for our talks. But we
were able to raise in-kind support from Atlanta hoteliers and oth-
ers who wanted to see peace come. They were glad to donate
hotel rooms. Others were glad to donate transportation services
and so forth. In Kenya, President Moi, as our host, underwrote
the peace process once we arrived on his soil, providing all of the
logistical and support arrangements that we needed for the talks
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there. But again, it was a substantial amount of money that had to
be raised externally in order to fund it.
What we have found, though, was that the cost of waging
peace is so economical compared to the cost of waging war. It's a
bargain. If you want to invest your money wisely, do it on this end
of the spectrum rather than on the defense budget. So it's not at
all crass-it's fundamental.
Participant: I have two questions. One: what are the advantages and
problems of being the only woman on the negotiating team? And
the other one is: working with eminent persons, I'm wondering,
you know, you also have eminent personalities (laughter). I'm
wondering what it's like as a negotiator workilng with them?
Dr. Spencer: The Eritreans accepted me immediately without reser-
vation; probably because a third of their fighting force is female,
and women soldiers who became pregnant would work in the
revolution until their babies were due. They'd deliver their babies,
and then hand them off to people to raise while they continued
the resistance fight. So Eritreans see women certainly on an equal
level as men.
For the Ethiopian government, the opposite was true. I went
'through this period of being tested by them, of having to demon-
strate that I knew a little bit about what I was talking about before
I was accepted, and that relationship evolved over time. I think I
was a bit of a novelty for both of them. Africa is sort of~a man's
world still, and so in some ways it's an advantage and a disadvan-
tage both.
With respect to the eminent persons, what we have found is
that we work best with them when we have them as a group. It's
like having a lot of big frogs in a pond; they control each other's
behavior,, they check each other's conduct. So when they're to-
gether as a group, they don't act up. Don't tell anybody I said
this, okay? But it's a different matter entirely managing them
sometimes on a one-on-one situation, you know, where they are the
eminent person in the room or at the table.
Professor Shaffer: Dr. Spencer, thank you very much.
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